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FORMALISM,  FERGUSON,  AND  THE  FUTURE  OF
QUALIFIED  IMMUNITY
Fred O. Smith, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, the story of suing governments and their
agents for money damages is a story marked by change and challenge.  Most
doctrines in that story have either undergone substantial revisions during
that period or faced sharp criticism.  The doctrine of state sovereign immu-
nity, for example, has slowly expanded, even as commentators and jurists
have sharply questioned its basic tenets and legitimacy.1  Leading scholars in
the field of federal courts have undermined the capacious nature of
prosecutorial immunity,2 and the Supreme Court seemed close to narrowing
© 2018 Fred O. Smith, Jr.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor, Emory Law School.  Thanks are due to the participants in
faculty workshops at Fordham Law and Seattle Law.  I am also indebted to Morgan
Birdman, Chloe Cobb, Karla Doe, Fiona O’Carroll, Sangita Sahasranaman, and Talia
Wagner for stellar research assistance.
1 Compare Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state’s agency for its failure to comply
with the provisions of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990), and Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that citizens are precluded from suits against
states grounded in federal law), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996)
(expanding sovereign immunity by holding that despite Congress’s “clear intent to abro-
gate the States’ sovereign immunity” in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Indian
Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that power), with Alden, 527 U.S. at 761 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority’s reasoning on sovereign immunity), and
Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2001) (“Sover-
eign immunity is an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from
American law.”), and Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant: Sovereign Immunity and
the Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1973 (2012), and
Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 212,
213 (1988) (reviewing JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES—THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987)) (noting that the Supreme Court’s
treatment of the Eleventh Amendment has some roots in the Court’s helping of the “South
out of its staggering, multi-million dollar post-Civil War debt crisis”).
2 See, e.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 53, 55 (arguing that absolute prosecutorial immunity should be reconsidered).
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the doctrine only a few terms ago.3 Bivens—the doctrine that allows suits
against federal officials for constitutional violations—has faced increased
scrutiny at One First Street, becoming narrower virtually each time the Court
touches it.4  The Court has also narrowed the class of cases allowed against
local governments,5 even as other Justices and many scholars have insisted
that the class of cases should actually be broader.
By comparison, qualified immunity is an anomaly, in that its basic tenets
went largely unchallenged by leading scholars and Justices for decades.  To
be sure, there have been fights at the Court about how the doctrine should
apply in given cases.6  And scholars have sometimes questioned whether
some circuits apply it too stringently,7 whether it should apply to suits for
nominal damages,8 and whether courts should have to answer whether an
official’s actions are unconstitutional even when said official is entitled to
qualified immunity.9  But the basics of the doctrine have gone largely
unquestioned since the Supreme Court’s 1982 case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald.10
3 See Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 558 U.S. 1103 (2010).  The Eighth Circuit
held that prosecutors were not immune from claims involving their improperly withheld
evidence.  McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008).  However, the
Supreme Court did not review the matter because the case was dismissed via the Court’s
Rule 46. McGhee, 558 U.S. at 1103. But see Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir.
2014) (finding that a prosecutor had not demonstrated an entitlement to absolute nor
qualified immunity for the fabrication of evidence).
4 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2017) (noting that expanding
the Bivens remedy is now a “‘disfavored’ judicial activity” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 675 (2008))); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 (2012) (holding that when a
“federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed personnel working at a privately
operated federal prison” for an alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment, “the prisoner
must seek a remedy under state tort law”); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63
(2001) (declining to extend Bivens “to allow recovery against a private corporation operat-
ing a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons”).
5 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (holding a municipality is not
vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the acts of its employees); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (“[I]n enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to
impose liability on a municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality
itself is the ‘moving force’ behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights.” (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978))).
6 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 732 (2002) (6–3 opinion).
7 See Elizabeth J. Norman & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV.
1499, 1556 (2002) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit has earned a reputation as being the
circuit of “unqualified immunity” (quoting Karen M. Blum, Too Clearly Cruel & Unusual;
Supreme Court Can Right Eighth Amendment Wrong, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. 7 (2002))); see
also Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity: The Constitutional Analysis and Its Application, 20
TOURO L. REV. 643, 665 (2004) (same).
8 See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1611 (2011).
9 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP.
CT. REV. 115, 137; Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1249 (2006).
10 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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There, the Court held that qualified immunity is an objective test, not a sub-
jective one.11  Since that decision, it has been the law that a government
official is entitled to qualified immunity in claims for money damages unless
she has violated a clearly established right that a reasonable person would
have known at the time of the violation.12  This has been generally accepted
with relative unanimity.
Until now.  In recent years, federal courts scholars have undermined
some of the basic empirical and legal assumptions undergirding qualified
immunity,13 and in 2017, one Justice expressed a willingness to reopen this
uncommonly stable doctrine.14  Indeed, the doctrine seems anachronistic in
light of two legal and social moments.  First, we are in an age of formalism
with respect to federal jurisdiction, as the Court is expressing increased skep-
ticism about court-created causes of action and court-created limits on fed-
eral judicial power.  Second, we are in an age of “Ferguson” or “post-
Ferguson”—the town that arrested the nation’s attention as its racially dis-
criminatory policing practices came to light.15  There is a palpable sense that
contemporary social movements are demanding greater accountability for
violations of rights, especially on matters at the intersection of criminal jus-
tice and race.16  And scholars such as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky have argued
that qualified immunity is to blame, in part, for the absence of proper
accountability in this area.17
11 Id. at 818–19.
12 Id. at 818.
13 See, e.g., William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45
(2018); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2017) [here-
inafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails] (suggesting adjustments to the qualified
immunity doctrine); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885
(2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification] (providing empirical evidence on the
pervasiveness of government indemnification).
14 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (noting his “growing concern with [the Court’s] quali-
fied immunity jurisprudence”).
15 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_depart
ment_report.pdf; see also Kyle J. Jacob, From Garner to Graham and Beyond: Police Liability for
Use of Deadly Force—Ferguson Case Study, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 325 (2016); Samuel P. Jordan,
Federalism, Democracy, and the Challenge of Ferguson, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1103 (2015); Doro-
thy A. Brown, Ferguson’s Perfect Storm of Racism, CNN (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/03/05/opinions/brown-ferguson-report/ (“If you were the member of a minority
group and tried to create a system to control and oppress the majority, you could not have
done a better job than the . . . leaders of Ferguson, Missouri.”).
16 See S. David Mitchell, Ferguson: Footnote or Transformative Event?, 80 MO. L. REV. 943,
950 (2015); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283
(2018).
17 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supreme-court-
protects-bad-cops.html?smid=pl-share; see also Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker,
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Both moments leave qualified immunity on uneasy ground.  If it is the
case that courts lack the authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction for pru-
dential reasons, as the Court has strongly suggested in the past few years, how
can it be that qualified immunity roars on unabated?  The doctrine is utterly
untethered from the text or history of Section 1983, for example.18  And
what is more, scholars such as Joanna Schwartz have shown that many of the
empirical assumptions that purportedly justify this lack of accountability are
wrong.19  Further, if it is the case that unconstitutional uses of force are in
need of a more significant range of deterrent remedies, a doctrine that for-
gives unreasonable—albeit “reasonably unreasonable”—uses of deadly force
stands as an inevitable target.  Worse, as I have written elsewhere, when gov-
ernmental defendants invoke qualified immunity and other immunities in
the same case, this sometimes means that there is no one to hold
accountable.20
This Essay explores whether formalism and accountability are compati-
ble lodestars as we steer toward a new future for qualified immunity.  Ulti-
mately, I argue that two existing proposals would bring the doctrine closer to
its text and history, mitigate against fragmentation in the law of constitu-
tional torts, and narrow the rights-remedies gap when government officials
violate the Constitution.  One proposal, by John Jeffries, would create a fault-
based system, where government officials and entities alike would be liable
for constitutional violations that are both unreasonable and unconstitu-
tional.21  Another proposal would render governmental employers’ liable for
the acts of their agents.
I. THE FORMALIST PARADOX
The plain text of Section 1983 begins with two words that place govern-
mental immunities in a precarious position from the outset: “Every per-
son.”22  The statute commands that “[e]very person who” under the color of
state law
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 65 (2015) (observing that scholars had
made this link).
18 See Baude, supra note 13; see also JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE
WAR ON TERROR 13–14, 16–17 (2017); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for
Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972); James E. Pfander & Jonathan L.
Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early
Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1863 (2010); Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immu-
nity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1987).
19 See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 13; Schwartz, Police Indemnifi-
cation, supra note 13.
20 Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 487 (2016).
21 See infra subsection III.B.1.
22 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ing for redress.23
The text only provides one exception: judicial immunity for certain types of
prospective relief.24
Qualified immunity nonetheless routinely blocks Section 1983 suits.
Government officials are insulated from damages actions unless those offi-
cials violate “clearly established law” that a reasonable official would have
known.  Sometimes the Court invokes what would appear to be a higher stan-
dard, protecting officers unless they are “plainly incompetent.”25  The gap
between this standard and the text is yawning.  And this gap presents some-
thing of a riddle in an age of formalist approaches to understanding both
statutory text and the nature of federal jurisdiction.
This Part explores that gap.  It observes the possibility that there were
multiple approaches to governmental immunity that various jurisdictions
across the United States employed at the common law.  In the event that
there are a range of plausible readings that can be defended on historical
grounds, this may well free us to identify, among this range of plausible read-
ings, the one that best ensures accountability in our current time.
A. Formalism and Judicial Power
The term “formalism” defies simple definition.  It was once used as a
term of derision, as scholars contended that judges sometimes used strict
linguistic trappings deceptively to hide the range of other plausible legal out-
comes.26  By the late 1980s, however, scholars like Fred Schauer noted that
formalism need not always embody deception.27  Sometimes legal rules do
bind, thereby restricting discretion.28  And, he noted, it is far from evident
that strict legal rules are inherently undesirable.  In the years that followed,
rules-based legal logic met a more strident and public defender by way of
Justice Antonin Scalia.  In A Matter of Interpretation, he proclaimed: “Long live
formalism.  It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of
men.”29
The rise of avowed and strongly defended formalism was not limited to
scholarly and public debates.  It made its way into legal doctrine.  With a
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
26 See Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1502, 1506–07 (1985); see also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509–10
(1988) (collecting criticisms of formalism for the proposition that, “[e]ven a cursory look
at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it is for decisions in law, or perspectives
on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever formalism is, it is not good”).
27 Schauer, supra note 26, at 520.
28 See id. at 525.
29 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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crescendoing emphasis over the past twenty years, Supreme Court decisions
remind us that it is text that matters most in constitutional and statutory
interpretation.  For example, it has become considerably harder to argue
that a congressional statute implies a cause of action.30  In previous eras,
when a statute did not explicitly provide for a cause of action, courts looked
to a statute’s purpose to determine whether Congress nonetheless so
intended.31  Causes of action were later understood to be implied when a
statute provided rights or benefits to an identifiable class of individuals.32
Not so today, unlike the “heady days”33 of old that ushered in an “ancien
regime”34 that sometimes focused on legislative purpose and legislative his-
tory, implied statutory causes of action are now impermissible absent affirma-
tive text that indicates Congress so intended.35
Constitutional causes of action have experienced a similar shift toward
formalist rules.  In the early 1970s, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that plaintiffs may sometimes
seek damages remedies against federal officials who, while acting under the
color of federal law, violated federal constitutional rights.36  While the Con-
stitution does not expressly permit such an action, the Court held that such a
remedy was necessary in order to ensure that the Amendment had force in
some contexts.  The Court observed that “[h]istorically, damages have been
regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib-
erty.”37  Roughly a decade later, the Court also made clear that litigants may
rely on Bivens even when the federal constitutional violations they have suf-
fered do not arise from the Fourth Amendment.38
Over the past two decades, however, the scope of Bivens claims has been
tightly circumscribed, as formalist conceptions of causes of action have taken
root.  The Court has held, for example, that one cannot rely on Bivens to sue
corporations that run private prisons for their employees’ constitutional vio-
lations.39  More recently, in Ziglar v. Abbasi,40 the Supreme Court considered
whether to grant relief to South Asian and Arab men who alleged that they
had been rounded up and abused on account of their race and religion in
the aftermath of 9/11.  The Court held that the detainees could not rely on
30 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3 (5th ed. 2007) (describing the
shift over time); Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Courts Not Federal Tribunals, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
175, 206 (2010) (same).
31 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1964).
32 See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
33 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
34 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001).
35 See id.
36 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
37 Id. at 395.
38 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 14–15 (1980) (Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Pass-
man, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (equal protection under the Fifth Amendment).
39 See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
40 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
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Bivens to challenge their allegedly discriminatory detention, or any harsh
conditions of this detention that resulted from official policymaking deci-
sions by high-ranking officials.41  When denying a remedy for the unlawful
detention and certain harsh conditions, the Court relied on principles
related to separation of powers and national security.42
In so doing, the Ziglar Court also expressed unease with the dissonance
between an implied constitutional cause of action and contemporary notions
of federal judicial power.43  The Court warned that “it is a significant step
under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that it has the
authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of action
for damages against federal officials in order to remedy a constitutional viola-
tion.”44  The Court observed that Bivens emerged during an “ancien regime” of
days past in which “the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to
‘provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective’ a statute’s pur-
pose.”45  Further, “[g]iven the notable change in the Court’s approach to
recognizing implied causes of action, . . . expanding the Bivens remedy is now
a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”46
In recent years, this formalist emphasis has also characterized the field
of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Expressing profound ambivalence as to
whether avowedly judge-made rules can ever block jurisdiction, the Court has
sometimes relabeled formerly prudential rules as “constitutional” or “statu-
tory.”47  The bar against generalized grievance—once understood as pruden-
tial48—is now described as constitutional.49  The same is now true of the bar
against taxpayer standing.50  Another standing rule has been converted into
a statutory rule rather than a prudential one: namely, that a plaintiffs’ claim
must be within the zone of interests anticipated by a statute or regulation.51
And the Court has raised questions about the legitimacy of a judge-made or
“prudential” component to ripeness.
As the Court stated in Lexmark v. Static Control Components, Inc., it is now
apparently the law that: “Just as a court cannot apply its independent policy
judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied,” Justice
Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court in 2014, “it cannot limit a cause of action
41 Id.
42 See id. at 1861 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)).
43 Id. at 1856.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1855 (citation omitted).
46 Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2008)).
47 See generally Fred O. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 VAND. L. REV. 845 (2017).
48 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
49 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (2014).
50 Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968), with Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
51 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1377.
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that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.”52  No wonder
qualified immunity is under scrutiny.
B. Restraining Immunity
Qualified immunity, as it applies today, cannot be reconciled with the
formalist conceptions of federal jurisdiction articulated in cases like Lexmark.
As noted, the text of Section 1983 says nothing about qualified immunity.
And importantly, the doctrine is difficult to reconcile with the state of the law
in the decades before and immediately after the passage of Section 1983 in
1871.  For example, in the nineteenth-century case of Little v. Barreme, the
Supreme Court rejected a government official’s broad claim that he was
immune from suit for violating a statute, notwithstanding instructions from
the President that authorized the conduct.53  What is more, in Myers v. Ander-
son, the Court initially rejected a state government official’s claim that he was
immune from suit.  A government official’s reliance on such immunity was
“fully disposed of . . . by the very terms of” Section 1983.54  A number of
scholars have identified the import of this case.55
William Baude’s article Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? is among the
most recent to elevate these important cases—and it has already proven to be
influential.56  He applies traditional modes of statutory interpretation to the
doctrine of qualified immunity, and demonstrates in a compelling fashion
that when applied, these modes of interpretation cannot sustain the doctrine
of qualified immunity as it exists today.57  The article has already been cited
in two judicial opinions, including a concurrence from Justice Clarence
Thomas.58  Notably, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court reconsider its
qualified immunity jurisprudence in an “appropriate case.”59  He suggested
that the Court should tailor qualified immunity in a manner that better rep-
resents the state of the common law in the nineteenth century.60
52 Id. at 1388 (citations omitted).
53 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).  This case is described in Baude,
supra note 13, and Pfander & Hunt, supra note 18.
54 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 378–379 (1915).
55 See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 497 n.1 (1992); Baude, supra
note 13, at 57; Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on
Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 609 (1985).
56 Baude, supra note 13.
57 See Fred O. Smith, Jr., The Trouble with Qualified Immunity, JOTWELL (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/the-trouble-with-qualified-immunity/ (reviewing Baude,
supra note 13).
58 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870–72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Melton v. Phillips, 875 F.3d 256, 268 (5th Cir. 2017)
(noting that the “clearly established law” standard is increasingly being questioned).
59 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1872 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
60 See id. at 1871 (“Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law
backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in
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The rhetoric of restraint that has resurfaced in the field of federal juris-
diction,61 then, is beginning to make its way into discussions about qualified
immunity in civil rights suits.  Whether this is a salutary development remains
to be seen.  I have written elsewhere that the resurgence of the principle that
the federal courts’ obligation to hear cases has not always resulted in fewer
restrictions on federal jurisdiction.62  Instead, the Court has recast formerly
prudential rules as constitutional and statutory.  I have noted that sometimes
this recasting is a form of “undemocratic restraint,” because these shifts often
result in undermining congressional commands, all while decreasing access
to courts.63
Qualified immunity need not follow that path.  Revisiting qualified
immunity offers a rare moment in which the Court’s rhetoric of restraint may
result in a doctrine that expands access to courts and aligns with congres-
sional intent.  This is because by leading accounts, common-law doctrines
offered less rigidity and more access to courts.64  Further, the possibility
remains that a formalist, textualist approach to qualified immunity would
result in the eradication of the doctrine in Section 1983 unless or until Con-
gress amends the statute in a manner that matches contemporary norms.
In order to achieve this kind of democratic formalism,65 at least two
principles are important.  First, it is important to disaggregate qualified
immunity in the context of Section 1983 and qualified immunity in the con-
text of Bivens.  Eradicating or reforming one need not mean eradicating or
reducing the other.  It may well be that Section 1983 suits and Bivens suits
need not invite the exact same immunities operating in the exact same
ways.66  The Court, to be sure, has previously suggested that it is undesirable
for federal and state officials to receive different types of immunities.  But
that reasoning has been functionally abandoned.  The Court has made it
considerably harder to sue federal officials under Bivens than state officials
under Section 1983.  Given that Bivens is a judge-made rule, it may well be
that judge-made exceptions are more defensible in that context.  Congress
created Section 1983, and its scope need not be limited to the scope of
immunity in the Bivens context.
A second caution is that looking for a single common-law state of affairs
as of 1871 in the name of restraining qualified immunity may prove illusory.
It may well be that there was no single common-law state of affairs.  Scholar-
ship has generally focused on how the United States Supreme Court treated
‘interpret[ing] the intent of Congress in enacting’ the Act.” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986))).
61 See supra Section I.A.
62 See generally Smith, supra note 47.
63 Id. at 851.
64 See Baude, supra note 13; Pfander, supra note 8, at 1614.
65 This phrase is borrowed from Cass Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107
YALE L.J. 529, 530 (1997) (reviewing SCALIA, supra note 29).
66 See generally Katherine Mims Crocker, Qualified Immunity and Structural Constitu-
tionalism (manuscript on file with author).
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questions of immunity in the nineteenth century when defining the scope of
immunities under Section 1983.  But it is not evident that in attempting to
discover a common-law doctrine from 1871 we should limit ourselves to that
very small universe.  Questions of immunity for state officials were more often
decided by state courts,67 and looking to those state court rulings may well
yield different approaches to qualified immunity.68  Some cases embraced a
strict liability approach, in which a government official executing a judgment
was strictly liable for his or her own mistakes.  “An officer seizes property at
his peril, and if he errs he must take the consequences,” this view held.69
Other cases focused on the distinction between tort and contract, exempting
officers from liability for unlawful or breached governmental contract.70
And still other cases embraced standards akin to negligence; officials who
acted unlawfully and negligently were liable.71
C. Freeing Immunity
If common law is the guide, and there are multiple plausible approaches
in the common law, perhaps this frees jurists and commentators to think
about which of these approaches works best to further accountability and
avoid some of the pitfalls of the current doctrine.  Beyond that, as it stands
today, there are many prudential, judge-crafted rules that guide courts’ dis-
cretion.  Examples include aspects of standing, adverseness, the political
question doctrine, and abstention.72  This is so despite the emphatic asser-
67 See, e.g., Hetfield v. Towsley, 3 Greene 584, 585 (Iowa 1852); Tyler v. Alford, 38 Me.
530, 532 (1854); Kuhn v. North, 1823 WL 2286, at *10 (Pa. 1823); Tutt v. Lewis, 7 Va. (3
Call.) 233, 233 (1802).
68 A third note: Even if there were some commonly accepted understanding of immu-
nity for government officials in 1871, it is not apparent this should satisfy the very strictest
of formalists.  Leading formalists have often warned that we are not bound by what draft-
ers’ thought on matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation.  We are bound by
what they said and what those words would have meant to an ordinary person.  This is why
the Court has rejected the view that statutes adopted while the Court had capacious under-
standings about implied statutory causes of action should receive that broad treatment
today.  Context matters to the extent it helps us understand and define words and terms.
It is not apparent what precise words in Section 1983 could be understood to support
qualified immunity, as it exists today or as it existed in some quarters in the nineteenth
century.  It is not the case that we are discussing a statute that uses the word “immunity”
and jurists are left with the task of defining it.  The statute says “every person.”  42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012).  Can the strictest forms of textualism find a commonly understood defini-
tion of “every” that an ordinary person in 1871 would have understood to exclude some
state violators of federal rights?  I do not endeavor to answer this question in this short
Essay.  But I would be remiss not to raise it.
69 Hibbard v. Thrasher, 65 Ill. 479, 480–81 (1872); see also Seip v. Tilghman, 23 Kan.
289, 291 (1880) (embracing a similar view); Ayer v. Bartlett, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 156, 164
(1829) (“The officer acts at his peril, and is answerable for any mistake.”).
70 See Tutt, 7 Va. at 232 (“A man, contracting on behalf of the State, is not liable in his
individual capacity.”).
71 See Blocker v. Clark, 54 S.E. 1022, 1024 (Ga. 1906).
72 See Smith, supra note 47, at 855–65.
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tions about the courts’ “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear cases within
their jurisdiction.73  Scholars such as David Shapiro have sharply defended
those limits.74  Thus, formalists and nonformalists alike should think about
which plausible outcome is the best fit for the future of immunity.  Before
turning expressly to that question, Part II will explore some of the current
doctrine’s pitfalls.
II. FRAGMENTATION
Qualified immunity as it exists today is fragmented in ways that under-
mine constitutional accountability.  Among other things, because the doc-
trine relies on principles of notice, difficult questions arise when binding
precedent is clear but the defendant nonetheless is under contradictory com-
mands.  That is, what should be done when circuit precedent says one thing,
but other legal guidance points in a different direction?  Should unreasona-
ble, even outrageous, constitutional violations be forgiven?  In addition to
this perhaps inevitable internal fragmentation within the doctrine of quali-
fied immunity, individual immunities more generally operate in isolation,
with scant attention paid to whether a victim of unconstitutional conduct will
see any kind of remedy.  This external fragmentation creates its own
problems, by increasing the likelihood that no one will be held accountable
for a constitutional violation.  Understanding these fault lines may help the
legal community craft a doctrine of immunity that results in more accounta-
bility and better comports with the rule of law.
A. State of the Immunity
A troubling Fourth Circuit case from March 2018 demonstrates the frag-
mented nature of qualified immunity and reveals some of the ways changes
to the doctrine are needed.  The case is Sims v. Labowitz.75  In 2014, a police
officer commanded a seventeen-year-old boy to undress.  In the presence of
two other armed officers, he demanded that the child masturbate and
become sexually aroused.76  The officer proceeded to take photographs of
the child’s genitals as a part of an ongoing investigation.  The crime that led
to the officer’s actions?  The boy had (consensually) sent sexually explicit
photographs to his fifteen-year-old girlfriend.77
A federal district court held that the officer was entitled to qualified
immunity because he was acting pursuant to a court-authorized warrant.78
73 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014); Sprint Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
74 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (1985).
75 885 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2018).  The initial opinion was issued in December 2017, but
was superseded after rehearing. See Sims v. Labowitz, 877 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2017).
76 Id. at 258–59.
77 Id.
78 Sims v. Richardson, No. 1:16-cv-572, 2016 WL 5219590 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 12 18-JUL-18 7:14
2104 notre dame law review [vol. 93:5
On appeal, in a 2–1 decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the officer was not
entitled to immunity, canvassing the state of the law with respect to privacy
and bodily integrity at the time of the officer’s actions.79  Judge Robert King
dissented, relying on the importance of court orders and official legal advice
in American law.80  The officer is not protected by qualified immunity.81
Still, the fact that such troubling facts could lead to such a splintered set of
legal opinions is sufficient to warrant a closer look at the law.  The case has
much to teach us about qualified immunity and its associated fragmented
tests, fragmented commands, and fragmented doctrines.
B. Fragmented Tests
There is broad agreement that qualified immunity involves two ques-
tions.  First, whether the government official violated a federal right, and sec-
ond, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation.82
Answering the second question can sometimes obviate the need to answer
the first.  If a right was not clearly established, judges may exercise their dis-
cretion and opt not to wade into whether the official’s conduct violated the
law.83
There is also agreement as to at least three of the principles that guide
the inquiry into whether a right is clearly established.  Courts should exercise
caution so as not to define the “right” at issue so broadly that qualified immu-
nity provides no meaningful protection or notice to government officials.84
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, for example, a court should not
merely ask whether it is clearly established that officers should not engage in
unreasonable seizures.  The right must be defined with enough specificity
that a reasonable official will know what conduct is or is not lawful.85  By way
of illustration, an officer may not use deadly force against a suspect who can-
not reasonably be said to constitute an imminent threat to the officer or
others.86  Further, a right can be clearly established because a violation is
“obvious” in light of the fair notice that a legal principle provides.87  For
example, because the Eighth Amendment makes plain that government offi-
cials should not use “malicious[ ] or sadistic[ ]” violence against prisoners,
officers who violate this standard in ways that are novel, but nonetheless obvi-
ous, are not entitled to immunity.88
79 Sims, 885 F.3d at 261.
80 Id. at 270 (King, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 265 (majority opinion).
82 See Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865–66 (2014).
83 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
84 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
85 See id.
86 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1985).
87 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
88 See id. at 761 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 325
(11th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
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Applying these principles, one might imagine that Sims is an easy case.
The Fourth Circuit had previously held that the “movement of clothing to
facilitate the visual inspection of a [person’s] naked body” is a type of “sexu-
ally invasive search” that heightens the liberty interest of the seized person.89
And in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the United States
Supreme Court warned that sexually invasive searches of children raise even
greater concerns because their “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the pat-
ent intrusiveness of the exposure.”90  Given those warnings, one might have
thought that officers had notice that commanding a child to masturbate in
order for officers to take photographs was unreasonable in light of preceden-
tial guidance, even if there were no cases in the circuit with identical facts.
When a person violates a clear legal command in a novel way, that person is
not necessarily insulated from accountability.91
Why, then, were federal judges so divided?  Simply put, the officer had a
warrant.92  He did not act alone.  A prosecutor condoned and helped seek
the warrant.  A state magistrate issued the warrant.  Even if the officers were
violating the law under Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, he was
acting in a way that a court and other legal actors had authorized.93
The split among the federal judges who have reviewed these facts is a
microcosm of a larger issue that I will call the conflicting notice problem.
What should happen when a circuit’s precedent says one thing, but a state
court’s order says another?  Beyond that, what should happen when a cir-
cuit’s precedent says one thing, but a demand from a supervisor or policy
requires a different outcome?94  Any future revision or restructuring of the
doctrine of qualified immunity must confront and take this issue seriously.
C. Fragmented Doctrines
One of the more remarkable aspects of the Sims case is that if the named
officer had not been amenable to suit, no one would have been.  That would
have been the end of the suit.  The prosecutor who helped the officer seek
89 United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 882–83 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
90 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009).
91 Hope, 536 U.S. at 754–55 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92 In the words of the dissent:
Strikingly, Detective Abbott did not go directly to the Prince William County
magistrate seeking the search warrant.  He went first to that county’s Common-
wealth’s Attorney and solicited the advice and approval of the prosecutor.  We
have recognized—in another qualified immunity case arising in the Old Domin-
ion—that an investigating detective’s “conference with the Commonwealth’s
Attorney and the subsequent issuance of the warrants by a neutral and detached
magistrate weigh heavily toward a finding that [the detective] is immune.”
Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d 254, 268 (4th Cir. 2018) (King, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000)).
93 Id. at 262.
94 See generally Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 307 (2015) (providing an officer with
qualified immunity for shooting into a moving vehicle before it was about to hit spikes in
the road, despite his supervisor’s command that he “stand by”).
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the warrant and judge who issued it were both entitled to absolute immu-
nity.95  Local governments are not liable under a theory of respondeat supe-
rior, so suing Manassas for the acts of government officials was not an option
either.96  Suing the State of Virginia for the actions of the magistrate?  Also
impermissible, because the State is entitled to sovereign immunity.97  An
injunction or declaratory judgment stating that this behavior violates the
Fourth Amendment?  Also impermissible, because the Court has found that a
plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective relief unless they can
demonstrate that a violation is likely to recur against her in the future.98
Neither the district court nor majority or dissenting opinions at the Fourth
Circuit noted that this was the only remedy available to Sims because when
the various immunity doctrines collectively operate there is no one left to
sue.
Extant doctrine instead treats various immunities like fragmented
islands.  Often, when a court dismisses a claim based upon one immunity
doctrine, other doctrines that simultaneously block accountability receive no
mention.99  Worst, sometimes the courts’ decisions on immunity questions
either imply or assume that there is some other remedy available that, in fact,
would not have been available in that case.100  Consider the case of Bogan v.
Scott-Harris, in which the Court held that local legislators are entitled to abso-
lute legislative immunity.101  Among the reasons the Court provided for
extending the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity was that suits are
available against municipal governments.  The Court explained that “certain
deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other
levels of government.”102  “Municipalities themselves can be held liable for
constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal Government are
often protected by sovereign immunity.”103  However, local governments are
often protected from suit because plaintiffs may not sue them for high-rank-
ing officials’ negligence,104 under theories of respondeat superior liability,105
or based on conduct by high-ranking officials who are not deemed “final
95 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978) (judicial immunity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
96 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Smith, supra note 20,
at 487 (describing this phenomenon).
97 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
98 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
99 See Smith, supra note 20, at 472 (“It is difficult to appreciate the scope, cause, or
nature of the accountability gap in constitutional torts if the various doctrines of immunity
and municipal causation are treated as disconnected or unrelated.”).
100 See id.
101 523 U.S. 44 (1998).
102 Id. at 53.
103 Id.
104 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011).
105 Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“We have
consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
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policymakers” under state law.106  Indeed, in the Bogan case itself, before the
case reached the Supreme Court, the First Circuit had already overturned a
jury’s finding that the city was liable.107
If we take accountability seriously, violations of civil rights that are met
with no remedy are of important concern.  Cases like Bogan and Sims show
the importance of thinking about the synergistic way that immunity doctrines
operate to proverbially close the courthouse door.  Understanding and
appreciating this, rather than treating the doctrines so disparately, can
enrich dialogue as to how to build a doctrine that works in the twenty-first
century.  That is, a doctrine where no accountability for serious violations of
the Constitution is treated as wrong, not routine.
III. THE FUTURE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Something is in the air with respect to qualified immunity.  Three
decades after the Court created the governing two-part test in Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, there is a palpable and growing sense that the test needs to be revis-
ited.  It is an avowedly judicially made rule that attempts to balance
competing deterrence concerns.  This appears amiss in an era in which the
Court increasingly demands textual support in positive law for causes of
action and limits on judicial discretion.  What is more, as other scholars in
this symposium issue have documented, some of the empirical assumptions
that guide the Harlow test are highly questionable.  Further, the fact that con-
stitutional violations sometimes go unchecked in the current doctrine raises
strong normative concerns in the way of accountability.  This lack of account-
ability stems in part, though not exclusively, from the fragmented nature of
the law of constitutional torts.
Where do we go from here?  There is a temptation, perhaps, to do away
with it.  If it has no basis in the text of positive law, and if its underlying
assumptions are wrong, then why not eradicate it in Section 1983 cases?  The
basic answer is that this creates new problems.  Holding a government official
personally liable for something she could not have reasonably known was
against the law would raise fairness concerns.  It would also have questionable
deterrence value, and place officials in untenable catch-22 situations when
the law, and an official’s prediction of what the law may one day be, come
into conflict.  Even those who insist that courts have no warrant to create
judicially crafted limits on their discretion should consider that consequence.
If judges eliminate qualified immunity, it would be up to Congress to deter-
mine whether and what type of qualified immunity should operate in the
future.  And thus, formalists and nonformalists who think about constitu-
tional torts have a responsibility to think both about a world without immu-
nity and what a new form of immunity should look like.
106 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion).
107 See Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d 427 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub
nom. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 520 U.S. 1263 (1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 44 (1998), and cert. denied
sub nom. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, 523 U.S. 1003 (1998).
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In this final Part, I attempt to draw on some of the lessons of this Essay
and other scholarship in the field of constitutional torts to think through the
consequences of: (1) no qualified immunity and (2) two existing proposals to
amend the law of governmental immunities in Section 1983 suits.  I argue
that these proposals could appeal to legal formalists by bringing the law
closer to the common law and render the law more consonant with the text,
all while increasing accountability.
A. Goodbye to All That?
As research mounts demonstrating qualified immunity’s deficiencies, it
is almost impossible not to at least ask the question whether the doctrine
should be eliminated altogether.  This is not only because of the doctrine’s
shaky legal foundation, but also because of the empirical reality that other
scholars have documented.  Governments, not government officials, tend to
foot the bill when an official is found liable, raising questions about the doc-
trine’s deterrence value.108  And the doctrine is not invoked nearly as often
as is generally assumed, which further undermines the notion that it is a
great bulwark between fairness and anarchy.109
My chief rebuttal to that argument comes by way of a hypothetical.
Imagine a county clerk in 2014 who, because it is against state law, does not
award marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  Let us call him Obbie Loving.
Imagine too that at the time, there is no binding precedent in Loving’s juris-
diction concluding that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to
marry.  Our imaginary county clerk, let us add, is gay and believes deeply in
marriage equality.  Now imagine that after the United States Supreme Court
does find that same-sex couples have a right to marry in 2015, couples who
were denied this right in 2014 sue Loving in his individual capacity for money
damages.110  They contend that even though the right for same-sex couples
was not clearly established in 2014, it does not matter.  Loving denied them
their constitutional rights, the plaintiffs argue, and must therefore pay.
Should Loving be liable in his individual capacity on the ground that he
should have ignored state law and foreseen new shifts in federal constitu-
tional law?
Concerns about notice and fairness in this hypothetical abound.  With
no immunity, a person could be held liable even when he or she is objectively
following the law as it exists, and is subjectively acting in good faith.  We
would sometimes be asking government officials to gamble: Follow state and
local guidance, or follow your perception of what the law may one day be.  If
you guess wrong, then you may find yourself liable.  Even beyond that, the
Court in Harlow noted that such a regime would potentially deter govern-
ment officials from doing their jobs, because they will sometimes wrongly
108 See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 13.
109 See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 13, at 12.
110 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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predict the future direction of the law and refuse to do things that are per-
fectly constitutional.
These concerns are lessened, to be sure, by Joanna Schwartz’s work
showing that governments ultimately pay a defendant’s cost.111  But it does
not necessarily follow that qualified immunity should be eliminated alto-
gether.  For one, even if the government indemnifies an individual defen-
dant, there are consequences to being held personally liable in a civil suit.  It
has implications for one’s credit history and background checks, which rou-
tinely ask about civil judgments.112  Indeed, one could well conclude based
on Schwartz’s research that since governments are paying anyway, it is gov-
ernmental immunity that should be eliminated or reduced, not qualified
immunity.
Immunity for government officials in some form has benefits in the way
of fairness and even accountable governance.  The question should be what
this immunity should look like, not simply whether it should exist at all.
B. The Future Is Now
As commentators and jurists continue to elevate the conversation about
qualified immunity, it is perhaps useful to think about preexisting proposals
in the field of constitutional torts, and ways in which they may be equipped to
address some of the rule-of-law, empirical, and normative concerns that
plague the doctrine.  At least two proposals could bring the law more in line
with formalism and accountability.
1. Fault-Based Regime
John Jeffries, Jr., a leading voice in the field of constitutional torts,
offered a proposal to address how “[t]he proliferation of inconsistent policies
and arbitrary distinctions renders constitutional tort law functionally unintel-
ligible.”113  He observed that while there are articles about various individual
immunities, “there are relatively few sustained efforts to understand the rela-
tions among these issues or to justify particular doctrines in terms applicable
to all.”114
Jeffries contends that the organizing principle of constitutional torts
should be “fault.”  This should be true regardless of the identity of the gov-
ernmental defendant, whether that defendant be a teacher, a municipality,
or a state.  Rather than the “gross negligence” or “recklessness” standard that
currently approximates the Court’s approach to qualified immunity,115
something more akin to negligence should trigger liability for most officials
111 See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 13, at 885.
112 See generally Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (discuss-
ing a court judgment’s effect on a credit report).
113 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 208
(2013).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 258.
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and defendants.  The question should not be whether a right was “clearly
established”—which places courts and litigants on a path toward identifying
the nuances of precedent at the time of the violation.  Rather, the question is
whether the conduct was “clearly unconstitutional.”116  He also contends that a
similar standard should apply to judges and prosecutors, at least where no
one else can be held liable for the conduct.  He objects to extending absolute
immunity to individuals “who could not reasonably have thought their actions
lawful” in “cases in which the remedial alternatives that make that regime
tolerable do not exist.”117  Further, unreasonable and unconstitutional
actions by high-ranking state and local policy officials should result in liability
against a state or local government.
Jeffries’s proposed approach would represent a significant improvement
over the current doctrine.  Cases like Sims v. Labowitz,118 discussed in Part II,
would not be close calls in the sense that at least one government actor
(whether it be the prosecutor, the judge, the officer, or the government
itself) would have been held liable.  That is, at least to the extent that the
judges would have been more likely to agree that it was an unreasonable and
unconstitutional decision to force a child to masturbate so that officers could
take photographs during the course of an investigation.  Even if it is so that
officers should have protection when they are acting pursuant to a warrant or
court order, the law should not ignore the fact that there were other govern-
ment officials who were more at fault.  If those officials acted unreasonably
and unconstitutionally, they should face liability.  To quote Jeffries,
That the defendant’s conduct was outrageous should not be irrelevant.
While it is true that outrageous misconduct is not necessarily unconstitu-
tional, the fact that an officer’s conduct was egregious should surely affect
whether she could reasonably have thought it lawful.  Conduct that is both
outrageous and unconstitutional should not be immune from damages
liability.119
This approach also has much to commend it from a rule-of-law perspec-
tive, both in terms of text and history.  Section 1983 renders “every person”
acting under the color of state law who commits a violation of federal rights,
or causes such a violation, to face liability.120  By treating all government offi-
cials who are at “fault”—officials who have behaved in an unreasonable and
unconstitutional manner—Jeffries’s approach would bring the law much
closer to the language of the statute.
It is also likely that Jeffries’s approach would find some support in the
common law.  As observed in Part I, American courts adopted a number of
regimes when it came to liability for government officials in the decades
before and after Section 1983’s passage.121  These standards sometimes
116 Id. at 263.
117 Id. at 220.
118 885 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2018).
119 Jeffries, supra note 113, at 263.
120 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
121 See supra Part I.
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looked much like negligence.  In the 1836 case of Tracy v. Swartwout, the
Supreme Court explained that “[w]here a ministerial officer acts in good
faith, for an injury done, he is not liable to exemplary damages; but he can
claim no further exemption, where his acts are clearly against law.”122  This
standard arguably comes closer to Jeffries’s “clearly unconstitutional” or
“clearly unlawful” standard than the Court’s “clearly established” standard.
Further, in Blocker v. Clark,123 a Georgia court found that a government offi-
cial could be liable even if the conduct fell short of recklessness.  Even where
an officer is not animated by “spite” and is not “reckless,” “the failure to exer-
cise ordinary care” is sometimes “inconsistent with good faith.”124  This, too,
looks more like a standard based in negligence and fault than the gross negli-
gence or recklessness regime that current doctrine approximates.
Jeffries’s proposal, then, has the ability to bolster accountability while
also appealing to concerns about formalism and fragmentation.  His propo-
sal also has the ability to meet some of the demands of a different “F”: the
Ferguson or Post-Ferguson Era.  Jeffries wrote his article before the deaths of
Eric Garner, Walter Scott, Tamir Rice, John Crawford, Sandra Bland, Sam
Dubose, or Philando Castile.  It was written before Ferguson became a house-
hold word as that city burned on American television sets and into our collec-
tive imaginations.  But Jeffries devoted special attention in his piece the
problem of excessive force.  “The unconstitutional use of excessive force
presents the most glaring case of the inadequacy of current law.”125
Jeffries’s proposal would dramatically improve the law in a way that has
the power to appeal to formalists seeking support in the common law, observ-
ers concerned about officers who face fragmented legal commands, com-
mentators who recognize that various fragmented doctrines operate together
to block liability, and citizens demanding more accountability from the gov-
ernment that swears to protect them.
2. Expansion of Respondeat Superior
Another approach would be to make local governments liable for the
unconstitutional acts of their employees.  This approach has multiple
advantages.
First, this approach is compatible with some, though not all, textually
based formalist conceptions of how Section 1983 should operate.  As an ini-
tial matter, scholars generally agree that the most plausible, textually sound
reading of Section 1983 would result in broad respondeat superior liabil-
ity.126  This proposal would bring the law closer to that textual reading.  Fur-
122 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 95 (1836).
123 54 S.E. 1022, 1024 (Ga. 1906).
124 Id.
125 Jeffries, supra note 113, at 264.
126 See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2196
(2005); Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 627, 635 (1999); Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons
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ther, this reading is entirely compatible with investigating and adopting
whichever form of qualified immunity (if any) is determined to be most prev-
alent prior to 1871.  It would only mean that, whatever the scope of qualified
immunity, there would be governmental liability in other cases.
Second, it would ensure that violations of constitutional rights always
have a remedy.  Today it is entirely possible for violations of constitutional
rights to go with no remedy at all.  This almost happened in Sims v. Labowitz,
but it actually happens in others, a phenomenon I have documented in prior
work.  It is one thing to say that an individual should not be held personally
liable when he violates the Constitution in a manner that was not apparently
unlawful at the time of the violation.  It is another to say that there should be
no remedy at all under these circumstances—no moment for the court to
hold someone accountable in anyway whatsoever for violating the
Constitution.
Third, this approach would bring the law of constitutional torts into
greater dialogue with the important empirical work that has happened in this
area.  The Court has expressed concern that respondeat superior liability
might undermine federalism by diverting city resources in ways that under-
mine the ability of local residents to govern themselves.  But generally speak-
ing, governments often already pay damages awards when their employees
violate the Constitution.127  The identity of the defendant in the wake of a
judgment may matter for some purposes, such as whether an individual has
to report a judgment to creditors or those conducting background checks.
But its effect on government budgets would seem overblown.  Expanding
respondeat superior liability brings the doctrine more in line with these facts.
Fourth, this approach reduces the negative consequences of fragmenta-
tion.  Various immunities doctrines can continue to develop independently,
but in individual cases, the fragmentation would not result in the absence of
a remedy.  In a case like Sims v. Labowitz, for example, even if the officer were
not liable because he acted pursuant to a court order, his employer would
still be liable.
This proposal differs from my own preferred approach to constitutional
liability against local governments, which I have offered elsewhere, and which
is markedly less formalist.128  My preferred approach would expand respon-
deat liability only when there is no other remedy available at law as a result of
various individual immunities.  Still, if formalism and accountability are the
primary lodestars, these norms are advanced by expanding respondeat supe-
rior liability to all cases in which a local official acting within the scope of her
employment.  And in this moment, the scholarship advocating that position
deserves renewed attention.
from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 n.13 (1989); Russell Glazer,
Comment, The Sherman Amendment: Congressional Rejection of Communal Liability for Civil
Rights Violations, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1371, 1406–21 (1992).
127 See Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 13.
128 See id. at 478.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-5\NDL510.txt unknown Seq: 21 18-JUL-18 7:14
2018] formalism,  ferguson,  and  qualified  immunity 2113
CONCLUSION
This is a promising moment in the life of constitutional accountability.
Qualified immunity is at the crossroads of multiple legal and social moments.
The Court is increasingly resisting legal rules that outpace statutory or consti-
tutional text.  And social movements are demanding more accountability,
especially with respect to constitutional violations at the intersection of crimi-
nal justice and race.  As courts and commentators revisit the doctrine, there
is an opportunity to meet the demands of this moment.  We can achieve a
doctrine simultaneously more faithful to text and history, more consistent
with empirical reality, and better equipped to achieve justice for victims of
constitutional harms.  The problems with the current doctrine are both glar-
ing and growing.  And they cannot be unseen.
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